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The author here proposes a broad study of pan-Canadian nationalism that demonstrates, first, that 
economic forces were the dominant structuring element in the nation-building narrative, thereby 
reinforcing the neo-Marxist theses of Eric Hobsbawm and Ernest Gellner. Secondly, the article 
revisits the thesis presented in George Grant’s seminal work Lament for a Nation, and concludes 
that his writing on pan-Canadian nationalism was remarkably premonitory. 
Cet article propose un retour sur le nationalisme pancanadien dans ses grandes lignes qui 
démontrera dans un premier temps que les forces économiques ont toujours été l’élément 
structurant du nationalisme canadien, renforçant ainsi les thèses néo-marxistes d’Eric Hobsbawm et 
Ernest Gellner. Ensuite l’auteur revisite la thèse présentée par George Grant dans son livre influent 
Lament for a Nation, et tire la conclusion que ses écrits sur les limites du nationalisme pancanadien 
sont remarquablement prémonitoires. 
 
This paper will begin by defining some terms and then will undertake 
a wide scope study of the nationalism that has structured the Canadian nation-
building project, seen here as one example of what Michael Hechter has called 
“state-building nationalism” (HECHTER 2000: 56-69), or what John Breuilly 
describes as “the intertwined histories of nationalism and state-building” 
(BREUILLY 2013:10). English-speaking Canadians have led the way in 
developing this form of nationalism in the service of a state-building project, 
but, since the 1960s, they have employed an inclusive strategy and tried to 
integrate French-speaking Canadians into the project, which explains why the 
current is more correctly referred to as Pan-Canadian nationalism, rather than 
English-Canadian nationalism. 
One of the central features of this particular nation-building project is 
that it has been structured from within its geopolitical position as a satellite to 
an imperialist power. The recognition of this position fifty years ago led the 
Canadian political philosopher George Grant to adopt a melancholic tone, 
lamenting the impossibility of true nationhood for his homeland. A half century 
later the present author will revisit Grant’s premonitions and his ultimate 
conclusion, namely that the liberal individualism at the heart of pan-Canadian 
nationalism bore the seeds of its demise. Grant was remarkably clairvoyant, and 
it will be shown here, that although he could not have predicted the actual 
process of demise, the basic schema of development he feared is in the process 
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of bearing itself out. This is primarily due to Canada’s tragic position as a 
satellite nation; in gaining full independence from the British Empire in 1931, it 
simply moved more firmly into a new role of satellite in the nascent American 
Empire. The danger inherent in this new geopolitical reality was only fully 
recognized in the 1960s; the new pan-Canadian nationalist discourse that 
appeared at this time can thus be seen as a response to two direct threats to the 
Canadian nation-building project, namely American continental domination 
and the burgeoning Québecois independence movement. 
In the Pierre Trudeau era pan-Canadian nationalism took hold and, in 
many ways, it transformed the country; many of the features associated with the 
contemporary Canadian identity can be traced to this formative period. 
However, the conservative George Grant was not satisfied; he suggested that 
the new nationalism was superficial because it was founded on a complete 
acceptance of the dominant ideology that structured the imperialist empire to 
the South, and he disparagingly referred to the Liberal Party’s political project 
as amounting to little more than obtaining the status of “junior partner” in an 
imperial project. 
This article will argue that Grant’s analysis was perspicacious and 
foreshadowed the Neo-Marxist critiques of Eric Hobsbawm and Ernest Gellner. 
This line of argument will lead us to suggest that Grant’s premonitory fears for 
Canadian nationhood have become particularly acute in the contemporary 
neoliberal era due to the threat that globalized neoliberalism poses to regional 
particularisms. As Grant had foreseen, Trudeau’s pan-Canadian nationalism has 
allowed a smooth transition to contemporary neoliberalism, which has 
accentuated the continental pull. And, again as Grant had foreseen, there is no 
longer any meaningful resistance to continental integration. In other words, 
English Canadian nationalism was constructed on shaky ideological 
foundations, foundations that leave its national project little more than an 
empty shell useful to capitalist development. George Grant’s lament appears in 
retrospect as premonitory, or as Northrop Frye once said, Canada has moved 
from a pre-national to a post-national state without ever having become a 
nation. 
Theoretical approaches to nationalism 
Historically, Canada has been a vehicle for resource extraction and 
liberal capitalist acquisitive conquest. A country that develops on this vision 
has insufficient resources for the romantic nationhood of Ernest Renan. As 
such, Canadian nationalism lends itself more easily to the analyses of Eric 
Hobsbawm and Ernest Gellner in which “the nation” simply facilitates 
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processes of capitalist accumulation. Modern multicultural Canada, while 
presenting a progressive and open face to the world, does not seem to offer its 
citizens a collective shared desire to build a unique society in the northern half 
of the continent. Instead it presents the ideal of the global village of individual 
opportunities. In a nutshell: in keeping with Grant’s conclusions, we will argue 
that a country structured around an ideology of liberal individualism within an 
economic environment of globalized free markets cannot sustain a national 
project. 
What is a nation? And what is nationalism? If we can answer these 
general questions we can then start to look at how to apply these definitions to 
Canada, and more specifically to the English Canadian variant since 1867. The 
problem, of course, for a short paper, is that providing the definitions is not 
straightforward. Hugh Seton-Watson, author of Nations and States: An Enquiry 
into the origins of nations and the politics of nationalism, a book that another 
specialist, Benedict Anderson, calls “by far the best and most comprehensive 
English-Language text on nationalism,” (ANDERSON 1991: 5) remarks: “I am 
driven to the conclusion that no “scientific definition” of the nation can be 
devised; yet the phenomenon has existed and exists” (SETON-WATSON 1977: 
5). We need read no further than the first page of Nations and Nationalism 
since 1780 by E.J. Hobsbawm to find another confounded specialist: “This term 
[nation] appears to represent something important in human affairs. But what 
exactly? Here lies the mystery” (HOBSBAWM 1990: 1). Hobsbawm goes on 
to quote the famous 19th century historian and British constitutional expert, 
Walter Bagehot, who says “We know what it is when you do not ask us, but we 
cannot very quickly explain or define it.” (HOBSBAWM 1990: 1) 
A common sense view would contend that “nation” is a term applied 
to a group of people living in a recognised, definable territory. This implies 
defining the group of people as well as the territory, although the two 
phenomena - a people and a recognized territory - do not necessarily coincide. 
If we put aside the question of territory and concentrate on the social group, 
traditional views of the nation look for definable shared cultural traits that 
produce a collective group identity, such as a common language, a common 
religion, shared folklore, and a shared historical narrative. 
Immediately we see that if these criteria for a nation are retained, the 
Canadian nation-building project has always been a challenge. Historically the 
country was created on a territory stolen from the Native peoples, who they 
themselves did not share a common language or culture. Even if we neglect the 
origins of conquest and limit our enquiry to the European invaders who 
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colonised and now control the northern half of North America, from a historic 
point of view we are confronted with a nation founded by two distinct settler 
groups: French-speaking Catholics and English-speaking Protestants. What’s 
more, each of these two puts forward its own historical narrative. The official 
multicultural policy of contemporary Canada loosens the sense of unity even 
more, not only due to the multitude of “heritage languages” and the desire to 
respect and promote cultural diversity, but mainly due to the negation of the 
historic bicultural reality of the European founding colonists that is inherent in 
multiculturalism. We could add that multiculturalism also carries with it an 
attitude of cultural relativity that denies full recognition of the legitimacy of the 
native peoples’ claim to the land. 
And yet in spite of these observations, the country’s history lends itself 
to an analysis based on the concept of nation-building. Canadian politicians, 
intellectuals and artists have built up a national narrative that has buttressed a 
collective identity, and created a sense of belonging for citizens. Canadian 
intellectuals have seized on Ernest Renan’s generous definition of the nation, a 
definition that provides an opening for a diverse country like Canada. For 
Renan, sharing a common language is not primordial, or to quote him directly: 
“il y a dans l’homme quelque chose de supérieur à la langue : c’est la volonté” 
(RENAN 1882: 19). Canada may lack cultural homogeneity, but can proclaim 
that it has constructed itself around its citizens’ shared desire to live together. 
And clearly since the Dominion of 1867, and the Westminster Act of 1931, it 
has gradually built up a set of symbols of nationhood. 
Canada, Inc. and the Marxist model of nationalism 
Leaving aside the separate nationalist project of the Québecois, though 
we will come back to this separate theme in the conclusion, let’s take a look at 
how the pan-Canadian nationalism has developed since 1867, focusing on how 
this project has been created in the geopolitical context of a satellite between 
two imperialist projects. 
In spite of recent attempts to retroactively assign a nationalist reading 
to the War of 18121, the earliest formal attempts at nation-building begin with 
                                                          
1
 The government of Stephen Harper created a controversy over their handling of the bicentennial 
commemoration of the War of 1812. The initiative was criticized by some for what they considered 
as excessive spending in a period marked by austerity measures, but the main issue in public debate 
concerned the government’s ostensible desire to elevate the status of the War and to retroactively 
grant it a role in the nation-building narrative. The episode is analyzed in Eric Weeks, “Forging an 
Identity in Bronze: Nation-Building through Ottawa’s Memorial Landscape”, Études canadiennes / 
Canadian Studies, 78, 2015, 49-75. 
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the confederation process, the status of Dominion in 1867 and the national 
railway, which was an integral part of the whole process. The new nationalist 
project was dubbed the “national policy” by John A. Macdonald. This policy 
was structured around the imperial preference and a West-East trade route 
across Canada and then across the Atlantic. It placed the “national” project 
within the strict limits of development within the British Empire. This policy 
was already structured as a means of resistance to American annexation, though 
this second geopolitical reality had not yet reached the level of influence it 
would gain in the 20th century. Macdonald was followed by a subsequent 
influential Prime Minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, elected in 1896. In spite of the 
change in partisan control in Parliament and the Cabinet, and in spite of 
Laurier’s more acute desire for self-government for Canada, there was a basic 
continuity. What is particularly striking about the early nationalist project, 
whether led by the Conservative Party leader Macdonald or the Liberal Party’s 
Laurier, is to see how closely it fits the Marxist model of nationalism as a 
project meeting the needs of capitalist accumulation. The central government 
played the role of a company expanding its activities by developing resource 
extraction, and actively looking for labour to achieve its economic development 
objectives. In particular, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Canada, Inc. 
needed to attract immigrant farmers willing to go west and develop cash crops 
for export. 
The historical record corresponds perfectly to the work of Ernest 
Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm. For both thinkers, the real role of the Nation, and 
its corollary nationalism, is not to help individuals find a sense of meaning and 
fulfilment from within a collective sense of belonging, but instead to ensure 
existing power structures and future economic expansion within a capitalist 
mode of production. The ultimate determining factor is thus economic, not 
cultural. Gellner tries to prove to us that the creation of the concept of the 
nation is part of a wider process of capitalist expansion. Hobsbawm is even 
more convincing in reinforcing Gellner’s critique of nationalism when he 
shows that the very word “nation” in its modern usage is an invention of the 
19th century; it must be seen as a modern concept created in order to meet the 
needs of modern industrial society (HOBSBAWM 1990: 5-8). Hobsbawm 
provides a schematic chronology with nation/nationalism existing in a 
prototype form in the post-French revolution era, becoming a dominant idea in 
the late 19th century and reaching its apogee before and just after the Second 
World War. He even predicts its future demise in the face of the forces of 
apparent globalisation. In the same line of thought, Benedict Anderson, author 
of Imagined Communities, comments “Minerva’s owl flies at dusk” 
Andrew IVES 
98 Études canadiennes/Canadian Studies, n° 84, 2018 
(ANDERSON 1991: 5) when noting that the keen academic interest in 
nationalism comes at a time when the concept may have outlived its 
usefulness.2 
The analyses of Gellner and Hobsbawm have much in common. The 
major difference between the two is in terms of disciplinary approach: 
Hobsbawm was a historian while Gellner was a sociologist and philosopher. 
Gellner’s discussion of nationalism, like Hobsbawm’s, presents a very different 
picture from that of Ernest Renan. Gellner rejects the romantic common culture 
vision to focus on the needs of the modern State; he goes on to conclude that 
the modern State needs nationalism to survive. Modern capitalism needs a well-
trained adaptable work force. In the early stages of the industrial revolution, 
mechanisation required specialisation of the work force. But as time went on, 
the rate of technological change required the work force to be constantly able to 
adapt. To be well trained, citizens need to have access to a solid high quality 
educational system; to be flexible and mobile, they need to broadly share a 
common high culture (GELLNER 1983: 8-14). Nationalism responds to both 
requirements: it creates a common high culture and with it a sense of pride and 
belonging, and this in turn inspires citizens to support state initiatives in 
financing and organising a common curriculum and a national school system. 
Nationalism is also important at times when competition for resources produce 
armed conflicts and require citizens to join the war effort. To sum up, the 
modern tendency towards cultural standardisation and homogeneity is due to 
economic forces. And the matrix for cultural standardisation is the nation. This 
viewpoint takes out the romantic sentimental attachment to nationhood and 
makes the nation little more than an agent for stimulating economic growth. 
When studying the narrative of Canadian nation building, Gellner and 
Hobsbawm’s analyses seem more and more pertinent; it would be hard to deny 
that the desire to create a nation has gone hand in hand with the desire to 
exploit the country’s resources profitably. Even today’s multicultural model 
can be interpreted from within the Marxist model of economic forces: 
multiculturalism seems to correspond to the next wave of capitalist expansion: 
globalised markets and the post national world. 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Canada may well be a prototype for a coming post-national era, but we lack the historical distance 
needed to pronounce on this hypothesis. 
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Pan-Canadian nationalism in the shadow of the American empire: the 
triumph of liberal individualism 
Let’s return to our historical look at pan-Canadian nationalism. In the 
Laurier era, a competing nationalist project was presented by the French 
Canadian Henri Bourassa. His project was very different and involved severing 
the ties to British imperialism, and encouraging French and English-speaking 
Canadians to join together in a truly independent bilingual and bicultural 
national project. Bourassa clearly was ahead of his time. The élite in English 
Canada had not yet advanced in their reflexion beyond membership in the 
imperial project and were certainly not ready to envisage an equal partnership 
for French Catholics. As such, Bourassa’s nationalist project attracted little 
support outside of his home province. 
Bourassa’s basic idea of an alliance between French and English 
Canadians to create a bicultural nation-state, however, was taken up by English 
Canadian nationalists in the 1960s and 1970s, albeit with significant 
modifications. Before looking at the fundamental difference between 
Bourassa’s bicultural nationalism, and Pierre Trudeau’s minority language 
protection model, it is important to point out that the new pan-Canadian 
nationalism was constructed in the context of growing dependence with regard 
to the American neighbour. It was a reaction against the potential loss of 
sovereignty and against the threat of becoming a subservient satellite; in short, 
the whole movement came into being as a reaction against the danger of 
American economic and political domination. During the 1962-63 defence 
crisis, John Diefenbaker took on a defiant stance in defence of Canadian 
sovereignty. The crisis began when Kennedy complained about insufficient 
support from Canada during Cuban missiles crisis. The rift widened when 
Diefenbaker refused to accept nuclear warheads as part of the NORAD 
continental defense system. During the subsequent election campaign, he lost 
support in public opinion due to his perceived lack of loyalty to the American 
ally. However, in spite of the changeover from Conservative to Liberal 
government, it was in the following years that we see the rise of awareness of 
the excessive level of foreign investment in Canada, and a retroactive 
recognition of Diefenbaker’s legitimate fear for Canadian sovereignty. Walter 
Gordon and Mel Watkins, two of the key figures in the economic nationalism 
movement, managed to become influential in the Trudeau years, the years in 
which the new brand of pan-Canadian nationalism took off, inspiring new 
initiatives such as the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) or the 
National Energy Programme (NEP). 
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Integration of the French fact became a necessary ingredient in this 
new nationalist project. Certainly it cannot be denied that the desire to integrate 
Québec into the nascent pan-Canadian nationalism was a reaction and a reply to 
the Quiet Revolution in Québec. But it is important to note that, even without 
Québecois nationalism, English Canada needed the French Canadians on-board 
if their project were to be viable. This can be shown in Grant’s common sense 
analysis presented in Lament for a Nation in 1965: 
The keystone of a Canadian nation is the French fact, the slightest 
knowledge of history makes this platitudinous. English-speaking 
Canadians who desire the survival of their nation have to cooperate with 
those who seek the continuance of Franco-American civilization 
(GRANT 1965: 20). 
Grant was a conservative who greatly admired Charles de Gaulle, but 
the same conclusion was reached by left-leaning nationalists who feared 
American domination: without Québec, both demographically and 
economically, the country could never face up to the American challenge. 
Quebec’s geographic position separating the Maritimes from the rest of English 
speaking Canada was of course another major concern. 
The Trudeau years were marked by the new pan-Canadian nationalism 
and a series of measures designed to limit American control over the economy. 
As a corollary to the policy of gaining control of its economy and developing 
initiatives to develop more value added manufacturing instead of exporting raw 
materials, Trudeau also implemented official bilingualism, and tried to inspire 
French Canadians from Québec to join the nation-building project. This was 
reminiscent of Bourassa’s bicultural nationalist project from the early 20th 
century. However Trudeau’s and Bourassa’s visions of partnership were 
strikingly different. Trudeau proposed bilingualism in federal jurisdictions and 
minority language protection, which was a far cry from Bourassa’s partnership 
of two peoples. Trudeau’s policy was fundamentally liberal; it conceived of 
society as a collection of individuals endowed with free will and in competition 
one against the other. Trudeau’s policy initiative did not recognize the 
Québécois as a people, but instead he hoped to protect the language rights of 
individuals who happened to speak French. 
This is just one illustration of the liberal individualism that has 
structured English-Canadian nationalism. Not only is the ideology structured 
around a denial of collective rights in favour of individual rights, but it goes 
hand in hand with economic liberalism. The liberal pan-Canadian agenda was 
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particularly favourable to the Canadian capitalist class, but more importantly it 
met the needs of multinationals. In any event, as George Grant pointed out a 
half century ago, a capitalist class in a satellite nation will be loyal to the 
imperial seat of power, not to the satellite: “our ruling class is composed of the 
same groups as that of the United States, with the signal difference that the 
Canadian ruling class looks across the border for its final authority” (Grant 
1965: 9). 
Brian Mulroney’s Conservative Party government, elected in 1984, 
acted immediately to create closer relations with the United States, and do away 
with any vexations suffered during the Trudeau era. Notably, the Mulroney 
government did away with the economic nationalism measures limiting foreign 
investment, and cancelled the NEP. They went on to negotiate a Free Trade 
agreement in 1989 (precursor to the future NAFTA signed in 1993). All that 
was left of Trudeau’s pan-Canadian nationalism were the symbols of 
nationhood: individuals choosing freely to wave red and white flags. English 
Canada has fallen into the trap announced and analysed by Gellner/Hobsbawm: 
its nationalism can clearly be seen as a veneer that serves the interest of 
capitalist accumulation. This has become even clearer in the age of 
neoliberalism, an ideology that arrived with Thatcher and Reagan, and has 
imposed itself in Canada and around the world since. Not only does this model 
of political economy put its faith in the efficiency of the unhindered free 
market, but neoliberal ideologues go further and wish to apply the liberal ideal 
of competition to areas that were hitherto not subject to the rules of the 
competitive free market, notably in the field of education, which is a domain of 
key importance in nurturing a nationalist sentiment. Paul Treanor, a recognized 
expert on neoliberalism, notes that in this philosophy, “every human being is an 
entrepreneur managing their own life, and should act as such” (TREANOR 
2005). Without pushing our analysis any further, it can immediately be seen 
that the neoliberal market model of society represents the anti-thesis of 
economic nationalism. Not only does it take away the means for a nation-state 
to make economic choices through regulatory measures and direct investment, 
but it weakens the sense of belonging of the individual citizen. 
Conclusion 
Canadian nation-building has been carried out in the shadow of two 
Empires and this geopolitical reality has made any nationalist project in the 
northern half of North America precarious. Building a national project in this 
context would have required a strong will amongst the people to resist imperial 
hegemony, but this has been lacking in English Canada. In particular the 
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ideological compatibility with the American republic has condemned 
meaningful nationalism in English-speaking Canada. The drab form of 
nationalism that has accompanied the “nation-building” narrative has simply 
facilitated capitalist accumulation and resource extraction, in line with the 
writing about nationalism by Marxist thinkers Gellner and Hobsbawm. As 
George Grant suggested a half century ago, the only hope for Canadian 
nationalism was to finally latch on to Henri Bourassa’s bicultural project from 
the early 20th century in order to actively resist the danger Bourassa called 
“l’Américanisme saxonisant.” But this option has not been pursued by English 
Canadian leaders. In the age of imperial preference, they seem to have been 
convinced of the desirability of the assimilation of the French-speaking 
minority. In the 1960s and 1970s, the pan-Canadian project did indeed pay 
special interest to French Canada centered in the province of Québec. However, 
the conscious decision by Trudeau and the Liberal Party to propose a form of 
nationalism grounded on individual rights, one that recognized individuals who 
speak French rather than a Québécois people, has led to its downfall. In 
Quebec, citizens have thus followed a separate trajectory and there the national 
question is still on the table. Quebecers will likely be asked again to decide 
whether they wish to blend into the neoliberal continental unit that pan-
Canadian nationalists have been proposing since the neoliberal turn of the 
1980s, or if they wish to resuscitate René Levesque’s “projet de société” and 
build something different. Given the recent history and the contemporary 
debate in English Canada, it is hard to imagine English Canadians offering 
anything more than free market prosperity in response to Quebecers’ dream of 
nationhood. This is a shame, for as Renan remarked long ago: “la communauté 
des intérêts fait des traités de commerce. Il y a dans la nationalité un côté de 
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